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Research across disciplines, including political science, has embraced the idea that 
individuals often possess ambivalent attitudes, but there is considerable disagreement 
about how to measure ambivalence. Determining an effective way of capturing such 
phenomena is important to our understanding of politics and public opinion. The 
literature offers several meta-attitudinal and operative measures of ambivalence. I 
discuss strengths and weaknesses of each of these approaches and conduct a test of the 
relative construct validity of two meta-attitudinal and two operative measures of social 
welfare ambivalence using data from a statewide survey of Florida residents in 2004. The 
findings suggest that one of the operative measures that forces respondents to rate their 
positive and negative feelings separately performs better than any of the other approaches 
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  The idea that people’s attitudes are a mix of considerations that may result in 
ambivalence is becoming accepted across disciplines. Ambivalence is defined as the 
simultaneous possession of positive and negative evaluations of a single attitude object 
(Albertson, Brehm, and Alvarez 2005; Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Armitage and Connor 
2000; Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson 1997; Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002; Eagly 
and Chaiken 1993; Gainous and Martinez 2005; McGraw, Hasecke, and Conger 2003; 
Newby-Clark, McGregor, and Zanna 2002; Priester and Petty 1996; Zaller 1992). The 
problem today is that most survey research is still treating attitudes as if they were uni-
polar. Simply, most survey indicators do not offer any systematic way of separating those 
who are ambivalent from those who are not. Those who are ambivalent are typically 
forced to pick a side or select a neutral response. The literature does offer several 
approaches to isolating the ambivalent; but there is no agreement as to which is 
preferable. This stems from disagreement regarding how ambivalence is conceptualized. 
In the following paper, I evaluate these measurement strategies. Specifically, I conduct a 
test of the relative construct validity of two meta-attitudinal and two operative measures 
of social welfare ambivalence.  
Meta-attitudinal measures of ambivalence simply ask respondents in various ways 
to state whether they are torn between sides on the issue at hand. Operative measures of 
ambivalence employ some means to ascertain the degree to which individuals are 
ambivalent without making respondents aware that this phenomenon is being measured. 
Prior research indicates that the correlations between meta-attitudinal and operative 
measures of ambivalence are modest in magnitude (Newby–Clark, McGregor, and Zanna 
2002; Priester and Petty 2001). If ambivalence is conceptualized as the simultaneous 
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possession of opposing feelings, then meta-attitudinal measures may often be indicators 
of uncertainty or nonattitude rather than ambivalence in the strictest terms. Operative 
measures provide the opportunity to remove the subjectivity of the respondent. Based on 
this reasoning, I expect that an operative measure which gauges positive and negative 
feelings separately will be a more accurate representation of ambivalence. 
If a measure is valid, or at least has construct validity, the theoretical correlates of 
the measure should serve as reliable predictors. Accordingly, I compare how well the 
theoretical sources of ambivalence including cognitive, affective, and cognitive-affective 
conflict predict each of the meta-attitudinal and operative measures. This test has two 
obvious assumptions: first, theory suggesting the likely sources of ambivalence is 
accurate, and second, measures of the sources of ambivalence are valid. As detailed 
below, theory in regards to the former is fairly well developed. Concerning the latter, the 
measures of the sources used here are based on standard indicators of values and group 
affect used in the American National Election Studies (ANES), so their validity has been 
repeatedly confirmed.   
The results presented here are consistent with the expectation that an operative 
measure of social welfare ambivalence which forces respondents to rate their positive and 
negative feelings separately will perform better than any of the other approaches 
currently offered in the literature. Before discussing these results, I briefly make the case 
for why we should care about ambivalence. This is followed by a critique of meta-
attitudinal and operative approaches to measurement and a review of the potential sources 
of ambivalence. Then the measures are detailed and the results presented, including a 
fully specified model of social welfare ambivalence.  
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Why Measure Ambivalence? 
While survey researchers have begun to accept that ambivalence is a standard 
attribute of attitudes (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002; 
Feldman and Zaller 1992; Zaller 1992), our measures have not caught up with theory. If 
ambivalence is a standard attribute of attitudes along with such other attributes as attitude 
importance (Krosnick and Abelson 1992; Krosnick 1988; Boninger, Krosnick, Berent 
1995), intensity (Krosnick and Abelson 1992; Krosnick et al. 1993), extremity and 
certainty (Alvarez and Brehm 1995), and these attributes are consequential to our 
understanding of attitudes in general (see Bassili 1996 for a review), it seems logical that 
we should determine the optimal way to measure the attribute of ambivalence. We have 
standard approaches in survey research to capture these other phenomena, such as Likert 
and rating scales, but no standard way to isolate ambivalence. It seems imperative to our 
understanding of attitudes in general that we develop such a measure.  
If standard indicators used in the major surveys utilized in the discipline (e.g. 
American National Election Studies and General Social Survey) offer no systematic way 
of distinguishing those who are ambivalent from those who are not, it is likely that the 
results of many of the studies that used these data are questionable. This is especially true 
when it comes to those that focus on attitudes about issues where ambivalence may be 
prevalent. For example, let us assume that social welfare ambivalence is widespread and 
that social welfare policy preferences are related to candidate evaluations. If a model of 
these evaluations accounts for policy preferences but not for ambivalence about the 
policy, the estimate for the effect of policy preferences will be biased. The relationship 
may appear to be stronger or weaker than it actually is. The exclusion of ambivalence 
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does not mean that previous research results are completely without merit, but it certainly 
suggests that some studies may need fine-tuning.  
Critique of Previous Approaches to Measuring Ambivalence 
Meta-Attitudinal Measures 
Meta-Attitudinal measures of ambivalence require respondents to state directly 
that they have opposing feelings. For example, respondents may be asked whether their 
attitudes are one-sided or mixed or whether they agree with statements like “I have 
positive and negative feelings about …..”. For example, Priester and Petty (1996, 2001) 
asked respondents to complete a series of 10-point scales designed to assess the extent to 
which their reactions were conflicted, mixed, and indecisive with respect to the attitude 
objects under observation.1 Using a typical large-sample survey, Mulligan and McGraw 
(2002) also employed a meta-attitudinal measure of ambivalence using the following 
indicator: 
Some people feel that there are only good things or bad things about this 
issue (a. government wiretapping, b. social welfare spending). Their 
feelings are consistent. Other people feel that there are both good things 
and bad things about this issue. Their feelings are inconsistent. Thinking 
about your own views, would you say that your feelings about this issue 
are extremely consistent, very consistent, somewhat consistent, somewhat 
inconsistent, very inconsistent, or extremely inconsistent? 
 
While other researchers have used slightly different wording, these two examples 
exemplify the meta-attitudinal approach, at least broadly.  
A strength of the meta-attitudinal approach is that it is practical. It requires one 
simple question that allows respondents to state if they are conflicted or mixed. In 
                                                 
1 Their study was based on an experiment but the booklets participants were asked to 
complete are comparable to surveys. Of course the sample is different than that in a 
typical survey (completely random), but the question wording was set up like a survey. 
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practice, we are often faced with trade-offs in survey research because of financial and 
time limitations. We can only have so many questions on any given instrument. With this 
approach, there is no need to have multiple questions gauging positive and negative 
responses separately. Thus, it is the least costly method.  
On the other hand, the meta-attitudinal approach treats ambivalence as a 
subjective experience rather than as an attribute of attitudes in general. If this is the case, 
then perhaps respondents are not in the best position to make a diagnosis. A medical 
doctor asks patients what their symptoms are and then makes a diagnosis. The meta-
attitudinal approach essentially asks respondents to diagnose themselves. This is probably 
not the best way to capture the phenomenon of an individual simultaneously possessing 
positive and negative evaluations of a single attitude object. Allowing respondents to 
assess the degree to which they possess these evaluations may allow extraneous factors to 
distort the measure.  
Operative Measures 
Operative measures of ambivalence involve some method of gauging the extent to 
which ambivalence exists without depending on an individual’s personal assessment. 
While several different strategies have been employed, they all share this common thread. 
What sets early strategies apart from later ones is that they involved the subjectivity of 
the researchers. For example, Feldman and Zaller (1992) asked survey respondents to 
state whatever thoughts came to mind as they answered two traditional closed-ended 
policy questions. Then they measured ambivalence by counting the number of conflicting 
considerations, spontaneous statements of ambivalence, and two-sided remarks (i.e., 
“Although I think X, I nevertheless favor Y”), finding strong support for the presence of 
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ambivalence in many of the respondents. This can be thought of as an operative measure 
of ambivalence because respondents were not asked to assess their own degree of 
ambivalence. However, this approach certainly required the subjective assessment of the 
researchers.  
Alvarez and Brehm (1995, 1997, and 1998) and Jacoby (2002) employ another 
variation of the operative approach. They inferred the presence of ambivalence in 
respondents’ attitudes from patterns of error variance in heteroskedastic probit and 
ordinary least squares regression models respectively. This measurement strategy 
involves analyzing the residuals of a model of the attitude object under examination. 
Residuals are the difference between the value for each respondent predicted from the 
probit equation and the actual observed response of that individual. They contend that the 
variance of these residuals should be higher among those who are ambivalent. 
Essentially, Jacoby and Alvarez and Brehm each test to see if the residual variance is 
higher among those who theory suggests should be ambivalent (e.g., those with values in 
conflict).  
Others have used another operative approach to measuring ambivalence where 
respondents are asked to rate how positively they feel toward an attitude object and then 
asked separately to rate how negatively they feel toward the object (Craig, Kane, and 
Martinez 2002; Craig, Martinez, and Kane 2005; Gainous and Martinez 2005; Martinez 
et al. 2005). The responses are then combined via a mathematical algorithm, yielding an 
ordinal measure of ambivalence.  
A strength of all of these operative approaches is that they all treat ambivalence as 
an attribute of attitudes in general as opposed to a subjective experience. In this case, 
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attitudes are a mix of multiple considerations (Zaller 1992), and the Feldman and Zaller 
approach as well as the strategy used by Craig and his colleagues give respondents the 
opportunity to express explicitly these multiple considerations. Alvarez and Brehm 
(1995, 1997, and 1998) clearly separate the respondent’s direct assessments of how 
mixed they are from the measurement, but they do not give respondents the opportunity 
to rate, simultaneously, how positively and negatively they feel toward the object at hand. 
This is where the approach used by Craig and his colleagues is the strongest. The 
operational definition they use most closely fits the conceptual definition offered in the 
psychology literature: the simultaneous possession of opposing feelings.  
The weakness of these operative approaches varies for each. Concerning Feldman 
and Zaller’s approach, the possession of “opposing considerations” may in fact indicate 
the presence of factors other than ambivalence such as equivocation (someone is trying 
not to make a bad impression on the interviewer), uncertainty (they are unsure of which 
side of the issue to choose), informedness (the respondent has sufficient information to 
cite both sides evenly while clearly favoring one or neither), or nonattitude (the 
respondent has no real position on the issue), or the questions may be ambiguous making 
them insufficient as indicators of preference (see Alvarez and Brehm 1995, 1997, 1998). 
Therefore, the possession of opposing considerations is not necessarily a product of or 
representative of ambivalence. Remember that ambivalence defined as an attribute of 
attitudes refers to conflict about a single attitude object. Expressing conflicting 
viewpoints that are not explicitly about the same object is not ambivalence.  
Alvarez and Brehm (1995) and Jacoby (2002) define ambivalence appropriately 
but use a measure that does not accurately represent their conceptualization. Inferring 
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ambivalence from patterns of residual variance is problematic on two levels. First, 
ambivalence is an individual-level concept and their inferences are essentially based upon 
aggregate-level data (error variance in a predictive model across groups). Second, these 
measures fail to distinguish ambivalence from the very things Alvarez and Brehm suggest 
are problematic with the Feldman and Zaller study (equivocation, uncertainty, 
informedness, and nonattitude). Error variance could be a result of these factors. They 
control for levels of political knowledge to account for such, but this approach still 
requires more assumptions than the other operative approach.  
There are a couple of obvious weaknesses with the measure used by Craig and his 
colleagues and by Gainous and Martinez. The first problem is that questioning about 
positive and negative feelings separately can involve complicated wording, which may 
confuse respondents. The next problem is a practical one. For each attitude object, they 
ask two questions. Surveys are expensive and if it is necessary to ask two questions for 
every one attitude object, the cost will potentially double. This may limit the number of 
objects or issues that can be included. Also, because it makes the survey longer, response 
rates would likely significantly drop off. Aside from this practical problem, this approach 
seems to be the closest representation of ambivalence, properly defined. 
Comparing Meta-attitudinal and Operative Approaches 
Bassili (1996) compares the validity of meta-attitudinal and operative measures of 
attitude strength, arguing that operative measures have more predictive validity. He 
suggests that two realms of psychological functioning exist: one comprised of operative 
psychological processes and the other comprised of impressions of these processes. So, 
meta-attitudinal measures may be picking up people’s reaction to feeling ambivalent 
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rather than the actual phenomena. If reactions vary, then the meta-attitudinal measure is 
capturing something other than the phenomena itself. Rather, it may be the byproduct of 
ambivalence. Thompson and her colleagues (1995) looked at the relationship between 
meta-attitudinal and operative measures of ambivalence and they were only moderately 
related (see also Newby-Clark, McGregor, and Zanna 2005; Priester and Petty 1996). 
Holbrook and Krosnick (2005) offer a more thorough evaluation of the relative validity 
of these approaches finding that each represents a distinct construct having different 
consequences for cognition and behavior. The implication here is that each may have 
different antecedents or sources. This is where the present study comes in. While prior 
work has examined the validity of these approaches by looking primarily at the 
consequences of ambivalence, I focus on the potential sources of ambivalence and 
compare how well these sources predict each measure.  
Theoretical Sources of Ambivalence  
 The literature offers three primary sources of ambivalence including cognitive 
conflict, affective conflict, and cognitive-affective conflict (Feldman and Zaller 1992; 
Martinez et al. 2005; Steenbergen and Brewer 2000). The basic idea is simple. People 
make decisions and form attitudes by using such cognitive and affective shortcuts as 
party identification, media cues, values, and feelings about groups among many others. 
These shortcuts permit individuals to make reasonable decisions with minimal effort 
(Fiske and Taylor 1991; Popkin 1991). Research contends that these cognitive and 
affective sources of attitudes may come into conflict, and as a result, stimulate 
ambivalence.  
 Value conflict is the most often mentioned cognitive source of ambivalence in the 
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literature (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Feldman and Zaller 1992; 
Katz and Hass 1988; Katz, Wackenhut, and Hass 1986; Martinez et al. 2005; Newby-
Clark, McGregor, and Zanna 2005). Values such as egalitarianism and economic 
individualism may come into conflict and stimulate ambivalence about social welfare 
(Feldman and Zaller 1992; Gainous and Martinez 2005). Research has also suggested that 
group affect or feelings about the perceived beneficiaries of welfare structure attitudes 
about the issue (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Cook and Barrett 1992; Gilens 1995; Jacoby 
2005; Kinder and Winter 2001; Nelson 1999; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991)2 and 
conflicting feelings may stimulate ambivalence (Lavine and Steenbergen 2005; 
Steenbergen and Brewer 2000). Likewise, conflict between values and group affect may 
also stimulate such ambivalence (Steenbergen and Brewer 2000).    
Data and Measurement 
 The present study is based on a telephone poll conducted from May 10-22, 2004 
by the Florida Voter survey organization. Six hundred seven respondents were chosen 
randomly from a list of all registered voters in the state of Florida. Only those whose 
names were drawn from the list were actually interviewed. Up to four callbacks were 
attempted on all working numbers and initial refusals. The margin of error is plus or 
minus four percentage points.3  
                                                 
2 Nelson (1999) does suggest that cognitive elements of outgroup attitudes dominate 
affect in their influence on policy opinion, but this study is not concerned with the 
primacy of one effect over another. 
3 Additional information can be obtained from the author, or from Florida Voter directly 
(954-584-0204). In order to avoid an unacceptable loss of cases in the analysis, I 
employed the MICE ("multiple imputation using chained equations"; see Horton and 
Lipsitz 2001) routine in the R statistical package to impute missing data. MICE does this 
by replacing each missing value with a random draw from a distribution estimated from a 
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Dependent Variables 
  The dependent variable, social welfare ambivalence, is measured using two meta-
attitudinal measures of ambivalence and two objective measures. The meta-attitudinal 
measures are derived from a split-sample experimental question contained in the 
instrument. Half of the sample was asked the following question: 
Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in 
areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Others 
feel it is important for the government to provide more services to citizens 
even if it means an increase in spending. Which of these positions is 
closest to your own views, or are you torn between the two?  
 
The other half of the sample was asked the following question: 
 
Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in 
areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Others 
feel it is important for the government to provide more services to citizens 
even if it means an increase in spending. Which of these positions is 
closest to your own views?  
 
After each, respondents were asked how strongly they felt about their position, and for 
the latter, interviewers were instructed to record any volunteered response that indicated 
the respondent was mixed or torn between sides as mixed. This created a 5-point scale 
ranging from fewer services/strongly to more services/strongly with torn or mixed 
responses in the middle for both indicators. Dummy variables were constructed from 
each of these indicators coding torn or mixed responses as 1 and other responses as 0. 
While it would be preferable to have meta-attitudinal measures that gauged the strength 
of ambivalence, these are what are available in these data. Further, they still represent the 
subjective experience of ambivalence. 
 The first operative measure was based on the design Thomson and her colleagues 
                                                                                                                                                 
maximum likelihood function based on other variables in the dataset. The imputed 
dataset was based on the mean values from five replicate datasets created by MICE. 
 11
(1996) used that was then modified by Craig and his colleagues (2002, 2005). 
Respondents were asked to indicate both how positively and how negatively they viewed 
several aspects of social welfare policy, using batteries of questions that were introduced 
as follows: 
I'm now going to read you a series of statements about the kinds of things 
some people think the government should be doing to address certain 
problems that are facing the country. After each, I'd like you to rate the 
statement on a 4-point scale to indicate how positively you feel toward it. 
If you do not have any positive feelings, give it the lowest rating of 1; if 
you have some positive feelings, rate it a 2; if you have generally positive 
feelings, rate it a 3; and if you have extremely positive feelings, rate it a 4. 
Please rate each statement based solely on how positively you feel about 
it, while ignoring or setting aside for the moment any negative feelings 
you may have. The first statement is. . . . 
 
The statements were then read and respondents were asked to rate each one separately. 
Then, following a number of filler questions, the introduction was repeated except with 
the words "positive" and "positively" replaced by "negative" and "negatively." If a person 
seemed unsure or confused at any point, interviewers were told to repeat the instructions 
as many times as necessary. 
 The specific aspects of social welfare policy that respondents were asked to 
evaluate are as follows: "The government should. . . ." 
• ensure that every citizen has adequate medical insurance; 
• provide programs to help homeless people find a place to live; 
• ensure that every child has access to a good education; 
• provide programs that improve the standard of living of poor Americans; 
• see to it that everyone who wants a job has one; 
• provide childcare programs to assist working parents; 
• ensure that the retirement benefits that citizens have built up over the years are 
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An index of ambivalence about social welfare policy was calculated using an algorithm 
developed by Thompson and her colleagues (1995; also see Kaplan 1972).4 Specifically, 
Ambivalence = [(P+ N)/2] - |P - N| 
where P is the positive reaction score and N is the negative reaction score. The range of 
scores for each of the seven items described above is –0.5 through 4.0, with intervals of 
0.5 (see Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002). A principal components factor analysis 
confirmed that all seven load on a single factor, and the reliability of an additive index 
constructed from them is very high (α = .860). 
 The next operative measure of ambivalence used a method similar to that 
employed by Alvarez and Brehm (1995, 1997, 1998, and 2002) and Jacoby (2002). 
Again, this measurement strategy involves analyzing the residuals of a model of the 
attitude object under examination. Residuals are the difference between the value for 
each respondent predicted from the ordered logit equation and the actual observed 
response of that individual. The idea here is that the fit of the equation to the data should 
be worse among individuals who are ambivalent because the range of acceptable 
responses for them is greater, simply because their attitude is not uni-polar. I extracted 
the residuals from a model of social welfare attitudes using ordered logit rather than 
probit (Alvarez and Brehm 1995, 1997, 1998, 2002) or ordinary least squares (Jacoby 
                                                 
4 This model is derived from a version of the semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, and 
Tannenbaum 1957), as modified by Kaplan (1972) in an effort to show that people's 
overall attitudes are made up of both positive and negative elements. Thompson and her 
colleagues (1995) adjusted the model to better account for the presence of polarized 
beliefs. See Craig, Kane, and Martinez (2002) for a more complete discussion of this 
measure as employed in a large-sample survey. 
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2002) because attitudes about social welfare were measured using the ordinal scale 
described above for the meta-attitudinal measures of ambivalence. Both groups (those 
who chose the torn response and those who offered a mixed response) were combined for 
purposes of the analysis here.5  This scale is modeled as a function of the most often cited 
sources of attitudes about government spending on social welfare including 
individualism, egalitarianism, feelings about the beneficiaries, party identification, race, 
gender, and income (see Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Feldman and Zaller 1992; Gilens 1988, 
1995; Goren 2001; Jacoby 2005; Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Kinder and Winter 2001; 
Tate 1994). Then, the residuals from the ordered logit estimates are extracted to create a 
new variable.6 The operationalization of each of these variables is described below.   
Independent Variables 
Now we can move to the measurement of the potential sources of ambivalence. For 
cognitive conflict, separate indicators of individualist and egalitarian values were 
constructed first. Respondents were read a series of companion statements and asked to 
say which came closer to their own opinion. For individualism,7 the item pairs were: 
                                                 
5 A dummy variable is added for the question form to the multivariate analysis presented 
below to control for any question format effect. The coefficient for the form dummy was 
trivial.  
6 Three of the seven independent variables reach traditional levels of statistical 
significance (p ≤ 0.05). Those who are more individualist are less likely to feel positively 
about social welfare. Conversely, egalitarianism is positively associated with support for 
social welfare. Republicans are less likely to feel positive than are independents or 
Democrats.  
7 These questions were designed to tap support for economic individualism, or a belief in 
the freedom to accumulate wealth. Scholars with a different substantive focus might 
prefer to measure individualism differently, for example, conceptualizing it in terms of a 
belief in freedom of expression. 
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• The government should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of 
living; or, the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. 
• We need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems; or, 
the free market can handle these problems without government being involved. 
For egalitarianism, the item pairs were: 
• We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country; or, we should do more 
to make sure that everyone is treated equally. 
• If people were treated more equally in this country, we would have many fewer 
problems; or, this country would be better off if we worried less about how equal 
people are.  
In all cases, responses were coded from 1 (strong support for the first statement in the 
pair) to 5 (strong support for the second statement); for the second egalitarianism pair, 
this scoring was reversed to provide consistency in direction of wording. The two sets of 
items were then combined into indices with scores ranging from 2 to 10 (high values 
reflecting stronger support for individualist or egalitarian values). 8  
A measure of cognitive conflict, which captures the magnitude of the difference 
between individualist and egalitarian values, was then calculated using the same 
algorithm as the one described earlier for measuring social welfare ambivalence; that is, 
Cognitive Conflict = [individualism + egalitarianism]/2 – |individualism - 
egalitarianism| 
with higher values representing more conflict. This item was rescaled to have values 
between 0 and 1.  
                                                 
8 These items did not scale that well together (taub = 0.16, p < 0.05 for the individualist 
items and taub = 0.22, p < 0.05 for the egalitarian items). These items were based on 
measures from ANES and they scale well together in those data but the approach here 
varies slightly. The companion statements used here in each indicator are derived from 
two separate indicators from ANES.  This allowed for the use of multiple measures with 
fewer questions on the survey. Perhaps collapsing two items into each indicator 
decreased the validity, as opposed to having four separate questions for each. 
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Research has also suggested that the effects of value conflict on ambivalence are 
dependent on the personal importance people place on their values respectively (Gainous 
and Martinez 2005). As one value becomes more important, ambivalence should 
decrease. Value importance is based on responses to two separate items, introduced as 
follows: “As you know, not everyone agrees on the different goals or values that our 
nation ought to pursue. I'm going to list three9 different goals and have you tell me how 
important each of them is to you personally.” The importance of egalitarianism and 
individualism was then determined based on answers to a pair of questions: 
• The first goal is equality, by which we mean a narrowing of the gap in wealth and 
power between rich and poor. How important is equality to you – extremely 
important, important, only somewhat important, or not important at all? . . . 
• And the third goal is a free marketplace, by which we mean all citizens having a 
chance to get ahead on their own without the government getting involved. How 
important is a free marketplace to you – extremely important, important, only 
somewhat important, or not important at all? 
Responses were recoded so that higher values represent greater importance. In 
addition, the relative importance of one value as opposed to the other was calculated as 
the absolute value of the difference between individualism importance and egalitarianism 
importance; higher numbers indicate that one of these values has priority over the other 
for the individual. For instance, someone who said one value was extremely important 
and the other was not important at all would get a score of 3 while someone who said 
both were extremely important would get a score of 0. So, the further the distance of 
importance between values, the higher the score. 
                                                 
9 The survey included a measure of the importance of traditional moral values, which was 
asked in between the two indicators used here.  
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Next, feelings about welfare beneficiaries are measured with two additive indices, 
one for positive feelings and another for negative feelings. These indices based on 
answers to two questions tapping respondents' affect toward “poor people” and “blacks” 
are used for the measures of cognitive-affective and affective conflict. Respondents were 
read the following introduction:  
Next, I'd like to do the same thing except with a list of different government 
institutions and groups that are active in politics. Once again: If you do not have 
any positive feelings toward the institution or group, give it the lowest rating of 1; 
if you have some positive feelings, rate it a 2; if you have generally positive 
feelings, rate it a 3; and if you have extremely positive feelings, rate it a 4. Please 
rate each institution or group based solely on how positively you feel about it, while 
ignoring or setting aside for the moment any negative feelings you may have. The 
first group is… 
The names of the groups and institutions were then read (including poor people and 
blacks) and respondents were asked to rate each one separately. Then, as with social 
welfare items, the introduction was repeated except with the words “positive” and 
“positively” replaced by “negative” and “negatively” following a number of filler 
questions. As before, scores range from 1 (no positive/negative feelings) to 4 (extremely 
positive/negative feelings) and from 2-8 after summing each respectively. The positive 
items and negative items scaled well together, indicating that people shared similar 
feelings across these two groups (positive feelings α = .772; negative feelings α = .868).  
These indices were used in combination with the values indicators described in the 
previous section to construct a measure of cognitive-affective conflict. The idea here is 
that we should expect conflict between individualist values and positive feelings about 
the perceived beneficiaries and between egalitarian values and negative feelings about the 
perceived beneficiaries to stimulate ambivalence. It is not logical to suggest that 
individualist values will come into conflict with negative feelings about the beneficiaries 
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or for egalitarian values to conflict with positive feelings because each has the same 
directional effect on attitude about social welfare. Rather than creating separate measures 
for each, the scale for positive feelings about the beneficiary and individualist values is 
inverted and each is added to negative feelings about the beneficiary and egalitarian 
values respectively. Flipping the scales gives them the same directional effect on attitudes 
about social welfare. Because there is no reason to expect that conflict is more likely to 
stimulate ambivalence for individualist/positive feelings or egalitarian/negative feelings 
conflict, inverting the scales permits one measure of cognitive-affective conflict. After 
summing the inverted scales with the non-inverted scales, each is rescaled so that all 
values fall between 0 and 1. The same algorithm as used above is again employed to 
create a scale of cognitive-affective conflict. The resulting scale is also normalized to 
have values between 0 and 1.  
A measure of affective conflict is created by summing the positive responses to 
poor people and blacks, summing the negative responses to poor people and blacks, and 
then using the same algorithm to juxtapose positive responses against negative responses. 
Next, this scale is recoded to have values that range between 0 and 1. Descriptions of all 
other control variables used are included in the appendix.  
-Insert Table 1 about here- 
Analysis 
Empirically Comparing Measurement Approaches 
Table 1 contains the zero-order correlations between each of the measures of social 
welfare ambivalence. There is not a strong relationship between any of these measures. 
There is a very weak positive relationship between the two operative measures (0.13). 
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There is a significant correlation between the meta-attitudinal measures and the operative 
residuals measure, but this relationship is suspect because the residuals and the meta-
attitudinal measures are based on the same indicator. The lack of correlation across these 
measures suggests they are not all capturing ambivalence. These results mirror the 
findings of previous research that suggested there was not a strong relationship between 
meta-attitudinal and operative ambivalence (Mulligan and McGraw 2002; Newby-Clark, 
McGregor, and Zanna 2002; Priester and Petty 2001), but also demonstrates that there is 
not much of a relationship between the two operative measures.  
The approach to analyzing the operative residuals measure employed by Alvarez 
and Brehm (1995, 1997, 1998, and 2002) is replicated before moving to a multivariate 
analysis of each of the measures. The replication involves comparing the variance across 
levels of cognitive, cognitive-affective, and affective conflict. The expectation is that the 
variance should be higher among those with more conflict. While this operative approach 
has shortcomings, it is replicated to give it the benefit of the doubt. The problem with this 
approach is two-fold. First, the measure of ambivalence is error variance. This variance 
could be high for reasons other than ambivalence (non-attitude, uncertainty). Second, the 
analysis gives us only aggregate inferences and ambivalence is an individual-level 
phenomenon. The latter problem is resolved later in this study by modeling the 
individual-level residuals as function of the sources and controls.10 Nonetheless, this 
approach has been used; so replicating it may verify that it is problematic.  
For this analysis, a dummy variable is created for each source of ambivalence that 
represents above-average conflict (0 = below mean, 1 = above mean). Next, the between-
                                                 
10 For an example of the same method using ordinary least squares regression see Marks 
et al. (2004). 
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group variance is analyzed. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is employed to 
test for the homogeneity of variance across groups (below mean, above mean). This 
involves getting a Levene statistic (the test statistic for a homogeneity of variances test) 
and the associated probability. This probability tells us the likelihood with which we can 
confidently reject the null hypothesis and accept the hypothesis that there is higher error 
variance when predicting attitudes about social welfare for those with higher levels of 
conflict as opposed to those with lower levels. 
-Insert Table 2 about here- 
The results of the analysis in Table 2 indicate that, other than cognitive conflict, the 
sources of ambivalence are not strong predictors of the error variance from the model of 
attitudes about social welfare. For that matter, the effect of cognitive conflict is in the 
opposite of the expected direction. These findings suggest that those who are less 
conflicted when it comes to values are actually more ambivalent. Further, the variance is 
higher for those with below average cognitive-affective and affective conflict, but this 
difference is not significant. If anything, this analysis tells us that the residuals are not a 
good measure of ambivalence (assuming that these measures of conflict are sources of 
ambivalence).  
It is important that we look at the relationship between the sources of ambivalence 
before moving on to the multivariate analysis of the residuals and other measures of 
ambivalence. Because each of these measures uses overlapping items to create scales, 
multicollinearity is potentially an issue. If these scales correlate highly, they contribute 
redundant information and can cause other variables to appear to be less important than 
they really are. Bivariate analysis indicates that the cognitive-affective conflict scale is 
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related to the affective scale (taub = 0.62, p ≤ 0.05) but not the cognitive conflict scale. 
Two separate models will be estimated for each dependent variable to address the 
problem of multicollinearity: one with cognitive-affective conflict and another with 
affective conflict. 
The models used to compare the relative construct validity of the four 
ambivalence measures are as follows:  
Model 1 
Social Welfare Ambivalence = a + β1 Cognitive Conflict +  β2 
Egalitarianism Importance + β3 Individualism Importance + β4 Relative 
Importance of Values + β5 Cognitive-Affective Conflict + β7 Female + β8 
Black + Income + β9 Political Knowledge + e 
 
Model 2 
Social Welfare Ambivalence = a + β1 Cognitive Conflict +  β2 
Egalitarianism Importance + β3 Individualism Importance + β4 Relative 
Importance of Values + β5 Affective Conflict + β7 Female + β8 Black + 
Income + β9 Political Knowledge + e 
 
While this prevents the simultaneous estimation of the relationship between cognitive-
affective conflict, affective conflict, and social welfare ambivalence, it does resolve the 
problem with multicollinearity.  
-Insert Table 3 about here- 
We get a better test of construct validity than the bivariate relationships presented 
above (Table 1) by looking at how well these models perform across all four measures of 
ambivalence. Table 3 contains the results of estimating the equations that model each of 
the two meta-attitudinal measures of ambivalence as a function of the potential sources of 
ambivalence. Controls are also included. The meta-attitudinal models where respondents 
“volunteered” mixed responses perform better than those where they were given the “torn 
between sides” option. Cognitive conflict and egalitarianism importance are significant in 
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the expected direction in the volunteered model. On the other hand, cognitive-affective 
conflict is significant but not in the expected direction. The findings here suggest that 
ambivalence goes down as this type of conflict goes up, ceteris paribus. While this model 
does have some reliable predictors in the right direction, the total number of respondents 
who volunteered a mixed response is low (n = 38), so it is likely many who are 
ambivalent selected some other response. 
None of the sources of ambivalence are significant in the “torn” models. This 
meta-attitudinal measure must be capturing something other than ambivalence (assuming 
the measures of conflict are valid). Basilli (1996) might suggest this meta-attitudinal 
measure is capturing people’s direct reaction to possessing positive and negative 
evaluations about social welfare. Obviously these reactions are not correlated with the 
sources of ambivalence, or the model would pick that up. In sum, the lack of findings 
across the meta-attitudinal measures suggests that they are not good measures of 
ambivalence. 
-Insert Table 4 about here- 
With the exception of the race and gender controls, there are no significant 
estimated effects in the model of the residuals (Table 4). These findings suggest that this 
is a poor measure of ambivalence. The final model that uses the combined positive and 
negative evaluations performs the best. Cognitive conflict, value importance and the 
relative difference of value importance, cognitive-affective conflict, affective conflict, 
race, and gender are all significant and in the expected direction. This makes sense if we 
think of ambivalence as an attribute of attitudes. If ambivalence is the simultaneous 
possession of positive and negative evaluations of a single attitude object, then this 
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measure makes the most intuitive sense, and based on these data, the most empirical 
sense.  
Discussion 
It is important that both researchers and “real world” practitioners develop an 
effective way to measure ambivalence. Presumably, researchers, campaigners, news 
organizations, and candidates are all interested in measures that are valid. Standard 
indicators included in the major surveys utilized in the discipline (e.g. American National 
Election Studies and General Social Survey) and in traditional benchmark and tracking 
polls offer no systematic way of distinguishing those who are ambivalent from those who 
are not. This means that the results of these surveys are questionable and potentially 
misleading.  
In this study, I compared several approaches to measuring ambivalence. The 
construct validity of each of the different measures was assessed by comparing how well 
the theoretical sources of ambivalence predict each measure respectively. The findings 
indicate that the approach adapted from earlier work (Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002; 
Craig, Martinez, and Kane 2005) that forces respondents to rate their positive and 
negative feelings separately is the most valid if we agree that ambivalence can be defined 
as the simultaneous possession of positive and negative evaluations. The evidence 
provides support to previous research that suggested ambivalence may result when 
individuals have conflicting thoughts or beliefs (cognitive conflict), conflicting feelings 
(affective conflict), or beliefs in conflict with feelings (cognitive-affective conflict). It is 
important to note the meta-attitudinal measures here may be capturing something other 
than ambivalence, strictly defined. Holbrook and Krosnick (2005) looked extensively at 
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consequences of meta-attitudinal ambivalence but more needs to be done the potential 
antecedents of such ambivalence. This will provide a more complete understanding of the 
concept in general, as well as the differences between these measures.  
While it seems that the operative approach used here is most accurate measure of 
ambivalence, this does not necessarily mean that we should always incorporate this 
approach in future surveys. As noted above, this is a time consuming and costly approach 
because every object must be evaluated twice. Nonetheless, the evidence presented here 
is eye-opening. For decades in survey research, we have been asking people they feel 
about various issues but have typically failed to consider the possibility that they may feel 
attitudes that are not uni-polar. The idea that people were willing to answer a telephone 
and tell somebody that they had extremely positive feelings and extremely negative 
feelings about the same thing is remarkable.  More than just a few people did so, and they 
did so for multiple policies. Furthermore, they were willing to do so just a few minutes 
apart. In fact, when it came to how people felt about ensuring that every citizen has 
adequate medical insurance 26 people (4.3 %) gave a score of 4 and 4 for extremely 
positive and extremely negative feelings. For providing programs to help homeless 
people 14 people (2.3 percent) did so, 41 people (6.8 percent) gave a score of 4 and 4 
regarding ensuring that every child has access to a good education, and 13 people (2.1 
percent) did so when asked about providing programs that improve the standard of living 
of poor Americans. As for seeing to it that everyone who wants a job has one 23 people 
(3.8 percent) gave a score of 4 and 4, 26 people (4.3 percent) for providing childcare 
programs to assist working parents, and 44 people (7.2 percent) for ensuring that the 
retirement benefits that citizens have built up over the years are protected. At first these 
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percentages may seem small, but considering these estimates only count those with the 
highest ambivalence score possible, the numbers are impressive. Further, more than half 
of the sample on many of the issues gave responses that were at least moderately 
conflicted (scores of at least 2 and 1).  
In conclusion, this widespread ambivalence speaks volumes about what goes on in 
American politics and elections today. The people who simultaneously choose extremely 
positive and extremely negative responses toward a host of social welfare items are the 
same people whom candidates are trying to court by taking positions on issues such as 
social welfare. How can they effectively gauge what their constituents want without a 
measure that represents their “true” opinion? And, how can researchers be confident in 
their explanations of social welfare attitudes? The results here are certainly a starting 
point, but more needs to be done to both explore the consequences and measurement of 
ambivalence. When public opinion researchers find agreement on the optimal approach to 
measuring social welfare ambivalence and ambivalence in general, there are a plethora of 
questions that can be revisited and pioneered. For instance, is the relationship between 
issue positions and candidate evaluations moderated by ambivalence, are those who are 
ambivalent more or less open to elite influence on those issues for which they are 
ambivalent, are voters more or less inclined to prioritize those issues for which they are 
ambivalent, and are ambivalent attitudes stable or do people resolve their ambivalence? If 
so, how does this occur? These are just a few of the questions that can be addressed. 
Appendix 
Additional Independent Variables: 
• Race - (0 = non-black, 1 = black) 
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• Gender - (0 = male, 1 = female)  
• Self reported income - (collapsed into 5 categories- less than $10,000, between 
$10,000 and $30,000, between $30,000 and $50,000, between $50,000 and 
$70,000, $70,000 or more). 
• Political knowledge - Respondents were read the following introduction: 
Here are a few questions about the government in Washington. Many people 
don't know the answers to these questions, but even if you're not sure I'd like 
you to tell me your best guess. 
 
Then they were asked the following questions: 
 
1. First, do you happen to know what job or political office is currently held by 
John Ashcroft?  
2. Who has the final responsibility to decide if a law is constitutional or not – is it 
the president, Congress, or the Supreme Court? 
3. Would you say that one of the parties is more conservative than the other at the 
national level? If yes: Which party is more conservative? (ROTATE)? 
 
Dummy variables were created for each correct response (0 = incorrect, 1 = correct). 
Then an additive index was constructed by adding the three together. Higher values 
represent more political knowledge.  
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Meta-attitudinal “Torn” 1.00 -- -- -- 
Meta-attitudinal “Volunteered” -- 1.00 -- -- 
Operative “Residuals” 0.31* 0.23* 1.00 -- 
Operative “Pos/Neg” 0.06 -0.08 0.13* 1.00 
     
 
Note: Data are from a Florida Voter survey of registered voters conducted in May 2004. 
The two direct variables cannot be correlated because they are each part of the same split-













    
Comparison 1    
Above-average Cognitive Conflict 1.90   
  7.05 0.01 
Below-average Cognitive Conflict 2.29   
    
Comparison 2    
Above-average Cognitive-Affective Conflict 1.99   
  0.00 0.99 
Below-average Cognitive-Affective Conflict 2.02   
    
Comparison 3    
Above-average Affective Conflict 1.90   
  1.39 0.24 
Below-average Affective Conflict 2.11   
    
 
Note: Data are from a Florida Voter survey of registered voters conducted in May 2004. 
The first column gives the within-group variances of the Ordered-Logit equation of social 
welfare attitudes. The second column gives the Levene statistic (the test statistic for a 














 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Cognitive Conflict 0.77 0.73 2.13** 2.16** 
 (0.56) (0.56) (0.78) (0.79) 
Cognitive-Affective Conflict -0.41 -- -1.97** -- 
 (0.60) -- (0.90) -- 
Affective Conflict  -- -0.15 -- -1.40** 
 -- (0.51) -- (0.82) 
Egalitarianism Importance -0.01 -0.01 -0.59** -0.25** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.09) 
Individualism Importance 0.16 0.16 -0.10 -0.12 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.23) 
Relative Difference 0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) 
Black -1.12* -1.12* 0.86 0.84 
 (0.65) (0.65) (0.60) (0.60) 
Female 0.83** 0.83** -0.26 -0.28 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.38) (0.38) 
Income 0.02 0.02 0.33* 0.33* 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.20) (0.19) 
Political Knowledge -0.20 -0.20 -0.16 -0.16 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.20) (0.20) 
Constant 1.91 2.02* 0.93 0.93 
 (1.00) (1.01) (1.37) (1.37) 
     
-2 log likelihood 317.76 318.15 200.40 202.66 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.16 
N 
 
304 304 303 303 
 
Note: Data are from 2004 Florida Voter survey. Table entries are logit estimates. 2-tailed 
test **p ≤ 0.05, *p ≤ 0.10. Standard errors are in parentheses. Missing values were 










 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Cognitive Conflict 0.47 0.51 1.31** 1.52** 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29) 
Cognitive-Affective Conflict 0.62 -- 3.41** -- 
 (0.33) -- (0.34) -- 
Affective Conflict  -- 0.35 -- 3.92** 
 -- (0.28) -- (0.30) 
Egalitarianism Importance -0.10 -0.10 -0.37** -0.25** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Individualism Importance 0.12 0.17 -0.38** -0.28** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Relative Difference -0.12 -0.13 -0.17* -0.17** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Black -0.19 -0.18 -1.03** -0.98** 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.27) 
Female -0.16 -0.17 -0.20 -0.26* 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Income -0.08 -0.08 0.02 0.06 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Political Knowledge -0.12 -0.12 0.08 0.03 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
     
-2 log likelihood 1759.00 1762.48 4239.78 4164.25 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.37 
N 
 
607 607 607 607 
 
Note: Data are from 2004 Florida Voter survey. Table entries are ordered-logit estimates 
(threshold levels are not shown). 2-tailed test **p ≤ 0.05, *p ≤ 0.10. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Missing values were replaced using multiple imputation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
